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Abstract 
The object of study is the dynamic of capital accumulation in Spain between 1999 and 2012, 
a period in which the Spanish economy has had first a system of fixed exchange rates, and 
then the monetary integration within the Eurozone. Investment has been largely driven by the 
revaluation of assets related to construction (mainly residential), which has generated a 
profound reshaping of the economic structure. Therefore, the relationship between 
investment, productivity and costs is first approached from a macroeconomic perspective, 
followed with an analysis of the composition by assets and sectors. Thus, it is shown that the 
most dynamic sectors have been those with relative low technical composition of capital, 
leading to absolute declines in labour productivity, as well as a price-effect that has 
completely distorted the reproduction of the Spanish economy. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In this article, the dynamics of capital accumulation in Spain between 1999 and 2012 are 
analysed. The study focuses on the central role of investment in both capital assets and labour 
force in order to consider the evolution of different expressions of the composition of the 
capital stock with respect to employment, wages and total output. In addition, it addresses 
labour productivity and costs, together with price deflators, with the purpose of revealing the 
specifics of how these variables have evolved and interacted in various major sectors of 
activity.
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The choice of the post-1999 period is justified for two reasons. Firstly, the analysis of this 
phase allows the peculiarities of the process of accumulation under conditions of fixed 
exchange rates, established in 1999, followed by the complete monetary integration within an 
area with a higher productive development (see AMECO, 2015) to be addressed. Secondly, 
the ‘Ley del suelo’ (Land law) was approved by the government led by the Popular Party in 
1998, and macroeconomic analysis shows that since the late 90s the housing bubble 
intensified in Spain (Bank of Spain [BoS], 2015a). The database used to account for the stock 
of capital, from FBBVA (2014), ends in 2012, so this article does not extend beyond this 
year. 
The theoretical framework of this research is based on the Marxist approach. However, this 
paper does not conduct a quantitative re-estimation of the new value created (surplus value 
and variable capital) and the capital stock, which would imply a complete reshaping of the 
national accounts from the conceptualisation of productive and unproductive labour (see 
Shaikh and Tonak, 1994). The economic sphere of reference will be the entire Spanish 
economy, excluding the real estate business, as the objective is to analyse the process of 
capital accumulation of all activities, once any redistribution of value has occurred.  
Capital is the basic social relation of the capitalist mode of production. In the analysis of the 
evolution of this category (capital accumulation), it is therefore important to study both the 
volume and the composition of capital stock so as to understand the level of development of 
productive forces, the economic growth and, thus, the income distribution and the type of 
external insertion. The integration of an economy like that of Spain into a large monetary area 
                                                 
1
 Let me clarify that this article does not intend to reveal the ultimate causes that led to this particular capital 
accumulation path, but to analyse how the reproduction of the economy has taken place in Spain. For an account 
of the underlying problem of valorisation, see Mateo (2015b).  
3 
 
(such as the Eurozone) is of the utmost interest from the Marxist economic approach as it 
reveals the implications for a country with lower level of productive development, in the 
sense of a reduced capacity to generate value, since the existence of a tendency toward real 
depreciation of exchange rate can be assumed (see Astarita, 2010).  
For these reasons, this article starts with the theoretical framework of the basic facts of the 
accumulation of capital, that later on will be used. Then, the empirical results are considered 
first from a macroeconomic perspective, followed by the analysis of the structure of capital 
assets and major sectors of the economy.  
Hereinafter, the following notes will be used to make reference to these major sectors, 
according to the National Institute of Statistics (INE, 2014a): AGR: agriculture and related 
activities; IND: industry (mining, manufacturing, water, gas, electricity); INCO: information 
and communication; GOV: government (administration, social services); CNT: construction; 
TTH: trade, transport and hotels; FIN: finances; RES: real estate; PRO: professional 
activities; OTH: other services.  
Spain had strong growth in this period, with an average of 3.77% and 2.27% for GDP and 
GDP per capita respectively. This growth rate was substantially higher than both the 
Eurozone-12 and EU-28, as well as the core economies of the monetary union (AMECO, 
2015). According to the INE (2014a), the gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) grew at an 
average of 5.55%, higher than not only GDP, but also household consumption (4.04%), the 
public sector spending (5.06%) and exports (4.99%), and only surpassed by the rise in 
imports (7.58%), explained by the conditions of (subordinated) external integration. 
Therefore, the process of accumulation has also been quantitatively the engine of the Spanish 
economy. However, investment has been driven by residential assets, with a significant rise 
in housing prices, which amounted to 167% in recent years.
2
 As a consequence, the 
construction sector boomed, creating a speculative bubble whose collapse in 2008 generated 
a long crisis from which the Spanish economy still has not recovered. 
There is a significant lack of research on the dynamics of capital accumulation in Spain for 
the period after 1999, particularly from a political economy approach, since in general these 
studies have a long-term perspective. Starting with those rooted in neoclassical economics, 
Mas, Pérez and Uriel (2006) limited themselves to the relationship between investment and 
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 We make reference to the price of square meter of private housing, so not subsidized by the public sector 
(BoS, 2015a).  
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capital productivity; Mas et al (2013) analyzed the period from 1964 to 2011, while the BoS 
(2009), although focusing on the period after 1995, does it in a non-exhaustive way, only as a 
complement of its overall outlook of the 2009 Annual Report, and comparing it with the 
European area. In the case of Marxist studies, Guerrero (2006), Cámara (2007) and Nieto 
(2006) address the relationship between capital accumulation and profitability since 1954, but 
only reaching 2001 (Guerrero and Cámara) and 2003 (Nieto), while Murillo (2008) focuses 
on the impact on workers and the wage relation. However, these authors do not take into 
account sectoral aspects or the re-configuration of the capital stock. 
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The process of capital accumulation refers to the dynamics in time of capitalist production in 
so far as it is conceived as a surplus value-generating (SV) system. Investment (I) of a portion 
of profit (p) is thus explained by the purpose of capital to increase the amount of surplus 
labour (SL) performed along the total working time (TL). For this, capital aims at reducing 
production costs, which in this context means cheapening the reproduction cost of the 
worker, the necessary labour time (NL): SL = TL − NL. The monetary expression takes the 
form of an attempt to increase the margin on wages (W) [variable capital, V] (see later) of the 
new value created (NV), so p = NV − W. This investment increases the stock of capital (K) 
by the productive accumulation of a part of profits, so I = ΔK. 
  
  
 
 
This dynamics of accumulation (k) incorporates the hiring of workers (L), which makes 
reference to two expressions that relate both variables. First, the capital-labour (K/L) ratio is a 
proxy of the Marxian concept of the ‘technical composition of capital’ (TCC, see Marx, 1867, 
III), which is in fact immeasurable, and which it constitutes itself the basis of both value and 
organic expressions of the composition of capital. 
    
 
    
 
  
 
 
Where K
* 
is the stock of capital at constant prices (K/PK), and PK the price index of K. 
Second, the annual flow of wages (W) received by these workers can be related in turn with 
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K, as a proxy to the so-called 'value composition of capital’ (Marx, 1867, III), so ‘W’ would 
be an indicator of variable capital (v → W ≈ v).3  
    
 
 
 
TCC and VCC are closely related. In principle, both tend to increase as the accumulation of 
capital and the productivity of labour develops, but the VCC should do it at a slower pace 
(Marx, 1867, III, Ch. XXIII, 2)  
    
  
   
 
  
  
    
  
  
 
Where wL = real wage per worker, PC = consumer price index, so LwLPC is the total amount 
of wages at current prices. VCC is explained by both TCC and the PK/WL ratio (in short: 
PkW), defined by Wolff (2001) as follows: 
Indicates how much wages must paid in order to obtain one unit of capital. It is like the average labour 
content of capital, except in wage terms instead of labour terms. In so far as wages tend to move with 
overall labour productivity, this term principally reflects the falling amount of labour (both direct and 
indirect) required to produce one unit of capital (…) An increase in labour productivity will, in turn, 
cause total (direct plus indirect) labour requirements to decline per unit of capital, and thus the ratio 
pk/w to fall (Wolff, 2001: 321) 
Therefore, the growth rate of the VCC should be less than that of TCC because the 
mechanisation of the production process shall reduce the labour requirements per unit of 
capital, so ΔVCC <ΔTCC is expected. 
Third, the capital stock is related to the total product (Y), the monetary expression of the NV 
created by the global worker. Reference could also be made to the materialised composition 
of capital (Shaikh, 1987) or, as it will subsequently be stated, the (labour) productivity of 
capital (PK), considering capital as a social relation including labour (see Mohun, 2009). 
When linking ‘Y’ with ‘K’, relying on the pattern of income distribution is avoided. In 
addition, the amount of capital used to produce ‘Y’ is a basic determinant of unit costs in 
fixed capital, which in turn determines the consumption of fixed capital (see González and 
                                                 
3
 There are controversies about the existence of a stock of variable capital (see Jones, 2012; Reuten, 2005) and 
how these categories should be quantified. For these discussions we refer to Mateo (2007), because this paper 
prioritises the empirical analysis with these ratios regardless of their closer degree of correspondence with what 
Marx could point to or not. Moreover, it is assumed that the amount of W incorporates part of income that 
actually corresponds to the surplus (certain executives), but also some of the operating surplus can be variable 
capital (some autonomous workers). Considering these elements, probably the 'variable capital' would be lower. 
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Mariña, 1992). (Labour) productivity of capital thus indicates the ability of the capitalist 
social relation to generate value, embodied in the total product. 
   
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
  
  
 
 
   
    
PK depends on the product at constant prices (Y*) per worker (labour productivity, π) with 
respect to the K/L ratio, as well as the ratio of price deflators (PYK=PY/PK). Note that labour 
productivity and TCC are not independent at all, as it is precisely the increase in the quantity 
of means of production per worker which does allow for the increasing levels of labour 
productivity, so TCC → π. The problem is that, gradually, the quantity of capital per worker 
needed to rise labour productivity becomes increased, implying a fall in the production 
efficiency of investment (PEI = π / TCC), that depresses the productivity of capital. 
  
    
   
If the evolution of productivity is balanced between sectors, price deflators of both means of 
production (PK) and wage-goods (PC) should be similar to the overall GDP deflator (PY). 
Under these conditions, the productivity of capital, which expresses the maximum 
profitability, ultimately depends on the capacity of surplus value-generation achieved with 
the investment materialized in TCC (Shaikh, 1990). According to the labour theory of value, 
there is a contradiction in the need to increase the level of means of production per unit of 
labour required to enlarge what actually is the objective of capitalist production, the SL. On 
the one hand, technical change should reduce the total unitary costs (TC) of production 
(TC/Y) through increased productivity, including inputs of constant (c) and variable (v) 
capital, so TC = c+v. It shall be expected that the rise in productivity exceeded the wage cost, 
thus generating a margin on wages (π − WL), which in fact explains the tendency in the 
sphere of distribution for the relative pauperisation of workers, or in other words, the 
increasing tendency in the profit share (ps) (p/Y). 
 (
 
 
)   (
 
 
)   (
 
 
) 
Yet, by increasing the K/L ratio, the fall in TC/Y implies a greater share of ‘c’, which means 
that the source of value (L) is progressively reduced in relative terms, and therefore the 
ability to generate SL. 
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However, as it will be shown later, the dynamics of accumulation in Spain during the period 
studied deeply distances itself from this general framework. The hallmark of the process was 
the inflation of assets related to construction, mostly residential, so one can speak of a 
‘housing boom’, and the accumulation of capital has been supported by a strengthening of the 
branches of non tradables. Both features are not contradictory with the above-mentioned 
theoretical (and abstract) model. On the contrary, it shows how capital accumulation was 
carried out in an economy inserted in a currency area with a higher level of productive 
development, and in a context of an underlying problem of valorisation (see Mateo, 2015b). 
Under these conditions, the Euro validates the domestic production at a level that does not 
correspond to the development of productive forces, as the primary determinant of the 
exchange rate (connecting domestic spaces of valorisation) is the relative productivity 
(Astarita, 2011).
4
 This fact has led to great distortions in the structure of the assets of the 
stock of capital, reflected in the sectoral configuration and thus a current account deficit and 
high indebtedness,
5
 which have proved unsustainable as it was not founded on a 
corresponding capacity of producing value (and surplus). And this particular path will be the 
object of study in the next section.  
III. MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
Technical change and productivity in Spain 
The period of growth of the Spanish economy between 1999 and 2007 was characterised by a 
strong rate of increase of the net capital stock, averaging 4.69%. However, this boom was not 
labour-saving, as wage labour grew at a rate of 3.57%. Consequently, the mechanisation of 
the production process had a contradictory evolution, only rising at a rate of 1.06% per year. 
This dynamic was radically reversed by the economic crisis. The near stagnation of capital 
accumulation, which descended steadily since 2007, caused an absolute decline in 
employment (-3.5% annually). As a result, the K/L ratio increased by 5.6% per year, because 
of the higher decline in the denominator (L), despite the reduction in the rate of 
accumulation.  
                                                 
4
 Although it is an imperfect indicator, note that the GDP per employed in Spain was, in 1999, 75% of the 
average of the euro area-12, and between 67 and 72% in relation to Germany, France, Austria and Finland 
(Ameco, 2015). The gap would be even greater if output per hour of work is taken (Mas et al, 2013). According 
to BoS (2009), Spain has 18 percentage points below the Eurozone average K/L ratio, which is also 
corroborated by Murillo (2010). 
5
 More than 5% of GDP from March 2004 and up to 10% through 2007-08 for the current balance, and a private 
debt growing from 96 to 210% of GDP between 1999 and 2009-10 (BoS, 2015a).  
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Figure 1. Annual rates of increase of K-L ratio and its determinants (1999-2012) (%)
6
 
 
                           Source: INE (2014a) and FBBVA (2014) 
Therefore, the behavior of TCC is anomalous, since it only increased 8.78% over the nine 
years of the upward phase, but it has risen 31.33% during the five years of recession. This 
highlights the high volatility of employment, which ultimately ‘determined’ the degree of 
mechanisation. However, it is to be noted that the crisis has caused a decline in the use of 
installed capacity. In industry, it averaged 80.64% until September 2007, when it descended 
from 82% to oscillate around 70-74% between the first quarter of 2009 and 2012. 
Figure 2. Industry capacity utilisation (%) 
 
                        Source: BoS (2015b) 
                                                 
6
 Some methodological questions: i) the measure of variables exclude the real estate activities, unless otherwise 
specified; K: non residential net fixed stock of capital at current prices, excluding real estate activities (FBBVA, 
2014); L: Full-time equivalent labour; Y= GDP, W: wage compensation; for wL, it is used the GDP deflator. 
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The distortion of the accumulation process in Spain also reveals itself in the relationship 
between TCC and VCC (fig. 3). Until 2007, the increase in the latter is higher by almost 10 
percentage points. The reason is that the PkW parameter, instead of descending as a 
consequence of the productive development, in fact increased 16.5%, although the maximum 
was reached a year earlier. This evolution reveals the labour-intensive character of the 
process of accumulation, which has not reduced labour requirements per unit of capital. 
Since the outbreak of the crisis, however, the categories show a profile more in line with what 
would be expected for a growth phase: i) a drop of PkW of almost 20% by 2012, enabling ii) 
a higher relative increase in K/L in relation to K/W. Yet, although the latter ratio has 
continued to increase, K/L has grown further, so the relative level in 2012 of both categories 
is almost equal compared to 1999, only 0.4 percentage points higher for TCC. 
Figure 3. Technical and value compositions of capital  
Capital-labour (TCC), capital-wages (VCC) and dPK/WL ratios (1999= 100) 
 
              Notes. dPK/WL: PkW                
              Source: INE (2014a) and FBBVA (2014) 
To the extent that TCC has depended more on the evolution of employment, the labour 
productivity achieved with the investment was also influenced by this fact, which in turn 
affects the productivity of capital (Fig. 4). The (labour) productive efficiency of investment 
has always fallen in this period, but there are a number of contradictory aspects to highlight: 
i) in the first two years the decrease is very small, but not based in a smaller difference 
between the increase in productivity with respect to mechanisation. Rather, it was the 
absolute decrease of Y/L, greater than that of K/L; ii) the downward trend between 2001 and 
2007 occurs in a context of stagnant productivity and a very weak mechanisation of the 
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production process; iii) the PEI falls between 2007 and 2009 mainly due to an increase in K/L 
derived from the fall of ‘L’, which although can achieve significant productivity gains, in 
relative terms the difference is higher. In short, the path of labour productivity was the 
inverse of what it should be theoretically expected, as it stagnated during the boom but rose 
with the crisis. Taking an index (1999 = 100), it was 99.43 in 2007 and 111.8 in 2012. 
Figure 4. Productivity of capital and its determinants (1999= 100) 
 
Notes. PK: productivity of capital; Y/L: labour productivity; PEI: productive efficiency of                                       
investment; Prices: product-capital ratio of prices (PY/PK).  
            Source: INE (2014a) and FBBVA (2014) 
Moreover, in this period the price deflator of the capital stock relatively increases with 
respect to the GDP, thus revealing either internal relative backwardness in production and/or 
the higher price of imported assets. It should be noted that not only did labour requirements 
per unit of capital increase, and so decrease the Y/K ratio, but it rose in the presence of fixed 
exchange rates. Therefore, this situation reveals an underlying problem of internal productive 
capacity and efficiency in the sphere of the means of production, related with high-
technology activities. 
Productive costs 
The consequence of this particular process of capital accumulation is an increase in 
production costs (inputs and wages). Regarding the GDP, they rose from 149% to 165.8% 
between 1999 and 2007, and then dropped even below the initial level of the series. Unit 
wage costs have ranged around 50-53%, slightly down until 2006 before rebounding with the 
crisis. Inputs per unit of output have increased, since they represented 96.9% in 1999, but in 
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2006-07 reached 115% of GDP.
7
 Following the crisis, they lost 18.5 points in t2007-09 and 
are constant thereafter. 
Figure 5. Inputs, wages and total costs with respect to GDP (%) 
 
                         Source: INE (2014a)  
In this sense, we must take into account that the depreciation of the stock of capital per unit 
of output increases substantially, from 13.45 to 17.79% of GDP in 2000-12 (INE, 2014b). 
This evolution occurs both in the years of growth and crisis, although it is slightly higher in 
the latter phase. This increase is surprising and problematic since the high share of 
construction assets, residential or not, as well as infrastructure, implies that the depreciation 
should be relatively smaller, since their useful life is high. However, if we compare the 
relative increase in terms of monetary value of each unit produced, the increase of 
depreciation turns out to be higher than the inputs.
8
 In addition, the unitary real labour cost 
(URLC) has also fallen. Following the AMECO (2015) database, a downward cyclical 
movement can be seen: a fall of 5.22% until 2006, before an increase up to 2009, when it 
reaches the same level as in 1999 (just 0.43% more), and a final decrease of 5.65%. 
IV. DISAGGREGATED ANALYSIS OF THE CAPITAL ACCUMULATION 
PROCESS  
In this section, the accumulation process is approached from the perspective of both the 
composition of investment by type of asset and the sectoral reconfiguration of the Spanish 
economy. 
                                                 
7
 If the gross value of production is taken, the inputs also increased their relative weight, from 51.8% in 1999 to 
56.3% in 2007, but going down to 50% in 2012. 
8
 The ratio IC/GDP increased by 5.5% until 2006, and then drops, so reaching a level 9% below it had in 1999, 
but the relative depreciation (DEP/GDP) increased by 32% until 2012. 
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Capital assets 
Consideration of the central role of the revalorisation of residential assets requires first 
analysis of the structure of prices and investment flows by type of capital asset. Figure 6 
shows the underlying price effect of this process of accumulation. A profound dualism 
between the prices of the assets related to the speculative boom (construction) and the rest is 
found, as prices of residential and other construction assets grew at a rate of 7.4 and 5.9%, 
respectively, between 1999 and 2006. The deflator of transport equipment, machinery and 
other equipment, meanwhile, showed a much lower rise of 2.1-2.7 % per year, while the price 
of intangible assets, mainly software, had an absolute annual downward trend of -3.8%. 
Figure 6. Price deflators of the assets of the stock of capital (inc. housing) 
Annual rates of change (%) (1999-08) 
 
                  Source: FBBVA (2014) 
Consequently, the accumulated variations of deflators are very different (Fig. 7). 
Construction assets became 64.7% (residential) and 49.1% (the rest) more expensive, while 
the above-mentioned second group of assets only had a rise of its prices of 16-20%, in 
contrast to a decrease of 23.9% for the intangibles deflator. Later, between 2006 and 2008, 
the differences are attenuated, as the price of residential assets only increased by 1.8% 
annually, less than other constructions (2.6%) and that of machinery and equipment (2.8%), 
but more than transport equipment (0.3%). 
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Figure 7. Price deflators of the assets of the stock of capital (inc. housing) 
Total variation (1999-08) 
 
               Source: FBBVA (2014) 
However, the crisis that began in 2008 radically changed this evolution, but not the distorted 
heterogeneity (Fig. 6 and 7, right). The deflator of residential assets experienced an average 
decline of -5.1% per year until 2012, which is reflected in a loss of value of nearly 19%, and 
that corresponding to other construction a change of -0.7% annually. Meanwhile, in the case 
of assets related to machinery and equipment, prices did not significantly increase. By 
contrast, and surprisingly, the deflator of intangible assets did rise, up to 5.18%. 
The price of residential assets, thus, exhibits a high volatility difficult to justify in terms of 
productive development and the amount of socially necessary labour time. In fact, there has 
probably been a feedback between prices and investment flows: the price has attracted 
investment and, in turn, investment has driven prices. This distortion of the investment can be 
seen by analysing their composition by asset, which shows that the assets with higher prices 
have been the most dynamic of the accumulation process (table 1).
9
 Those related with 
construction have received almost 70% of total investment during the boom, and still during 
the recession it has represented two-thirds, demonstrating the persistence of imbalances. By 
contrast, machinery, equipment and other assets received only 17.7% of the total investment, 
along with a downward trend, with a loss of 8 percentage points in seven years. The 
investment at constant prices offers minor differences, since the average annual growth rate 
                                                 
9
 This direct relationship is typical of a speculative bubble in which the dynamic factor is a price-effect. It would 
be expected, under normal conditions, that investment increased productivity, so thus reducing costs, and 
therefore lowering prices.  
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of the first group is 5.45-6.18%, slightly higher than the second (4.32%), but less than 
investment in intangible assets, which turns out to be the more dynamic (8.21%). 
Table 1. Investment by type of asset  
Composition of total investment at current prices and annual rates of change (ARCh) (%) 
 
                       Source: FBBVA (2014) 
The crisis, at least until 2012, has not yet profoundly reshaped the conditions for capital 
accumulation. The fall in the volume of investment in residential assets is high, at 12% per 
year, similar to that for the rest of construction and transport equipment, but these assets 
continue to receive the bulk of investment between 2007 and 2012.
10
   
Major sectors of activity 
Sectoral restructuring is the other side of the distortions of the dynamics of accumulation in 
Spain. In this process, the price effect has also played a central role. In terms of GDP at 
current prices, the most noteworthy aspect is the increase in the relative weight in GDP of the 
sectors related to the construction boom, together with certain services.
11
 Sectoral imbalances 
in the process of capital accumulation can be seen in table 2, in which sectors are grouped 
based on their relative level of TCC. First, agriculture, the whole industry, information and 
communication and that of government, with a K/L ratio ranging between 112 and 160% of 
                                                 
10
 Keep in mind that investment in transport infrastructure in Spain is quite distorted. On the one hand, it 
responds to a business structure characterized by its low size and geographical dispersion. At the same time, it 
has worked as a mechanism, led by the State, to provide profitable investment outlets for large corporations, 
even without responding to any rational economic necessity and were, therefore, unfeasible. Examples of 
airports in smaller cities (Castellón), high-speed train network and toll roads (Madrid) without use do prove it. 
Therefore, transport has been a complement to the asset bubble, which in turn is linked to the role of the 
economic intervention of the State (see table 2). 
11
 Construction, which in 1999 was below 9%, reached over 12% between 2005 and 2009, and real estate also 
increased its share (from 5.4 to 6.9%), although it has to be considered the imputations of rents. TTH activities 
have maintained a share above 20%, while professional services increasing theirs from 5.4 to 7.1% between 
1999 and 2012. The group of industries not only had had a low share, but also showing a downward trend, from 
19% in 1999 to 15% since 2006 (see Mateo, 2015a).   
1999-07 2008-12 1999-07 2007-12
Total 5.69 -8.31
1. Housing 38.63 33.11 6.18 -12.53
2. Other constructions 31.04 33.72 5.45 -8.48
3. Transport eq. 8.62 7.35 5.66 -8.85
4. Machinery, eq. & other 17.16 18.93 4.32 -3.14
   4.1 Metal products 2.55 2.79 1.93 -5.68
   4.2 Mach. & mech. eq. 6.12 7.01 3.01 -5.14
  4.3 Office eq. & hardware 1.92 1.78 12.50 2.16
5. Intangible 4.18 6.38 8.21 2.99
Total investment ARCh
15 
 
total average (excluding real estate) between 1999 and 2007. Then, construction, TTH, 
different services and finance,
12
 whose TCC amounted between one third and 80% of the 
total. 
Table 2. Relative level of TCC and composition of total investment by sectors 
TCC in % of average (total –real estate) and investment in residential and other construction assets (% of total 
including residential) 
 
                     Source: INE (2015a) and FBBVA (2014) 
The share of investment in housing and other constructions has no direct relationship with the 
level of mechanisation, but there are elements to underline. AGR, IND and INCO show a 
level substantially below average (27-44% of the total), while government activities, despite 
its high TCC, are intensive in this type of investment, which reveals their participation in the 
construction boom.
13
  
Sectoral distortions in the accumulation process are shown in table 3. The first aspect worth 
mentioning is the low level of investment channeled to the industrial activities, which did not 
even get 14% of the total, considering the size of this sector.
14
 Meanwhile, 41% of the total 
flow of investment was directed to CNT and RES. So, about two thirds of total investment, 
including that of residential type, was destined to sectors with lower levels of mechanisation. 
These investment flows have caused a rate of increase in the stock of capital heavily 
                                                 
12
 In taking the stock of fixed capital, the financial sector appears in activities with lower levels of TCC, but it 
should be kept in mind the particularities of its activity, in fact strengthened by the housing boom.  
13
 As stated before, the public sector has largely complemented the asset-inflation-related valorisation of capital, 
and in close connection with the transport infrastructure. The State can carry out investments in expensive 
capital-intensive projects, while enabling private companies to reap the benefits using their infrastructure, even 
in activities with lower costs.  
14
 In addition, 35-38% of this investment has been allocated at the low technology manufactures, and total low 
and medium-low technology manufactures accounted for more than two-thirds (68-69%) between 1999 and 
2007, according to the classification of OECD (2015).  
1999 2007 1999 2007 2012
Total - - 63.39 71.29 60.03
AGR 156.90 149.03 40.43 35.33 25.95
IND 124.37 139.27 43.58 37.21 34.92
INCO 112.71 160.02 36.42 27.72 32.72
GOV 113.44 114.67 75.73 77.00 71.65
CNT 53.26 68.46 74.57 85.36 75.34
TTH 82.83 77.83 50.13 46.96 35.72
FIN 75.00 62.75 -23.20 -35.99 52.73
RES - - 99.50 98.78 98.86
PRO 57.00 44.74 39.38 29.86 34.93
OTH 33.71 59.48 64.38 71.59 62.87
K/L: relative level Total Investment
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differentiated in these sectoral terms. Thus, the most dynamic activities in this regard have 
been generally those with relatively lower levels of TCC with the exception of information 
and communication. 
Table 3. Sectoral distortions in the accumulation process (1999-07) (%) 
Composition of total variation (Δ) and annual rates of change (ARCh) 
  
Notes. I: investment, K: capital; L: labour; Y: product;  
       Source: INE (2015a) and FBBVA (2014) 
The hiring of workers in Spain has been even more concentrated than investments, as 1/3 of 
salaried jobs were created in TTH, 1/4 in CNT and 1/5 in PRO, representing 77.5% of the 
salaried employment generated. These three groups of activities have levels below average in 
mechanisation, and of those, only construction increased its TCC, at a rate of 4.28% per year, 
which resulted in almost 40% of total increase. The other sectors that did show a significant 
increase in TCC were OTH and INCO, with average annual rates of 8.5 and 5.6% 
respectively. 
There are two elements to emphasise in relation to the process of accumulation and 
productive mechanisation. Firstly, the most dynamic sectors in terms of ‘k’ are labour 
intensive, that is, with relatively low levels of TCC, which is usually associated with lower 
technological content. Secondly, biased investment towards activities with lower 
technological development has not even served to balance the sectoral structure of the TCC, 
so that disparities widened over the growth phase. Only construction and other services have 
achieved some convergence, but in this second case, starting from an extremely low level in 
relative terms, only 33.7% of the average of TCC in 1999, and less than 60% in 2007. 
I K L K/L Y/L K/L Y/L
%∆ total ARCh %∆ total
Total 100.00 4.77 100.00 1.12 0.00 9.34 0.01
AGR 1.91 1.35 0.76 0.41 -0.13 3.33 -1.00
IND 13.94 2.39 -1.55 2.50 1.81 21.82 15.46
INCO 4.18 9.32 2.29 5.58 1.96 54.45 16.77
GOV 12.95 4.06 18.36 1.19 0.76 9.97 6.26
CNT 10.41 10.68 25.01 4.28 -1.65 39.83 -12.47
TTH 16.05 4.95 32.21 0.28 -1.45 2.23 -11.01
FIN 1.64 0.44 0.94 -1.17 8.42 -8.99 90.88
RES 30.68 7.24 1.67 -1.11 -5.80 -8.58 -37.98
PRO 4.86 7.44 20.31 -1.95 -3.60 -14.61 -25.41
OTH 3.38 12.64 7.81 8.49 0.00 91.91 -0.03
Exc. RES - 4.69 - 1.06 -0.07 8.78 -0.57
ARCh Total
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In the second part of table 3 the relationship between TCC and labour productivity can be 
analysed. As shown in in section III, the aggregate behavior of the productive efficiency of 
investment was certainly deficient, and now it is shown that it actually hides deep sectoral 
asymmetries. 
i) Only finance achieves an annually increase in labour productivity above 2%. However, ithe 
outstanding performance (8.4% per year) reveals the housing boom financed by banks, to 
both households and non-financial corporations, with a rather fictitious character. 
ii) The sectors that could increase labour productivity, although at levels below 2% per year, 
were IND, INCO and GOV. However, several clarifications are imposed: 
a) The increase in productivity achieved was substantially lower than the corresponding 
increase in TCC: only 35% in the case of INCO, and less than 63% and 72% for GOV 
and IND respectively; 
b) The absolute level of productivity of GOV is relatively low, 65-70% on average 
(excluding real estate); and 
c) The Spanish industry has suffered this restructuring in the benefit of non-tradable 
activities, so it has specialised in activities of medium-low technological content (see 
De Juan and Lopez 2004; García and Tello 2011). It has a reduced relative level of 
K/L compared to other countries in the European Union (BoS, 2009), which is 
reflected in their relative productivity. Thus, in 1999 it only reached 84% of the 
national average, while in 2007 at least was close to it (98%).
15
 The value added 
shares relative to manufacturing of low and medium-low technology manufacturers 
account for around two-thirds of the total value added in manufacturing, but only 6-
7% for high technology (OECD, 2015). In relation to the total economy, high and 
medium-high technology manufacturers show a very low level, and substantially with 
a downward trend, from 6.4% to 4.2% in 1999-09. However, imports of these 
products represent 56-49% of the total (OECD, 2015). 
                                                 
15
 Total industrial production increased by just 1.87% between December 1999 and 2007 (BoS, 2015a), but it 
nevertheless remains true that Spain increased its participation in the European industrial production, and is one 
of the countries, together with Greece and Portugal, with the lowest weight of higher technological level 
industries (see Álvarez et al, 2013). 
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iii) With the exception of finance, below-average TCC sectors had fallen in absolute levels of 
productivity or, in the case of OTH, stagnation, although some of them will increase the K/L 
ratio. 
Consequently, the economic sectors of the bottom of the figure, with lower technological 
level in terms of the TCC, received two thirds of the investment (67%), including residential, 
and generated 87% of total employment, but paradoxically experienced declines in 
productivity (-10 to -25% in 1999-07). There are two exceptions: i) other services, with the 
absolute lowest level of TCC; and ii) finance, which in turn relates to the distortions 
associated with the housing boom. 
Moreover, the crisis that began in 2007-08 has fostered some sectoral reconfiguration of 
capital accumulation, but outstanding distortions remain: the four sectors with an annual 
growth rate of capital stock (non-residential) above 3% are CNT, RES, OTH, as well as 
GOV. The fall in the rate of accumulation has generated a significant reduction in salaried 
employment, which in 2012 fell by 16.4% compared to 2007. The job losses are explained by 
three sectors, as more than a half occurred in construction, and nearly a fifth in TTH, which 
in fact contributed to the fall in unemployment during the expansion. It should be noted as 
well that industry was responsible for 23.4% of the decline in employment. 
Table 4. Capital, labour and productivity by sectors (2007-12) 
Composition of total variation (Δ) and annual rates of change (ARCh) 
 
                Notes. K: stock of capital; L: labour; Y: product; ARCh: annual rates of change 
                Source: INE (2015a) and FBBVA (2014) 
K L L K/L relative K/L Y/L
%∆ total 2012
Total 2.43 -3.52 100.00 5.72     2.65
AGR 0.53 -1.16 0.96 122.43         1.53     -0.88
IND 1.42 -4.93 23.40 145.53         6.53     4.09
INCO 2.38 -0.05 0.04 136.79         2.34     2.01
GOV 3.44 0.42 -2.90 98.50           2.44     1.64
CNT 3.21 -16.98 56.43 145.01         22.71   10.04
TTH 1.79 -2.47 19.30 72.42           4.09     2.80
FIN -2.36 -1.86 1.30 46.29           0.63 -    -0.29
RES 6.06 -1.18 0.29 475.58         6.53     2.21
PRO -1.60 -0.39 1.19 31.28           1.69 -    0.93
OTH 7.01 -1.19 2.57 65.60           7.69     1.42
Exc. RES 2.29 -3.54 - 100.00         5.60     2.37
ARCh ARCh
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Only finance and agricultural sectors saw declines in productivity. Meanwhile, the labour 
productivity of construction rose 10% annually, followed by industry (4%) and TTH (2.8%). 
That is, precisely the sectors in which there have been absolute job losses. Consequently, the 
crisis did not lead, at least for these five years, to any modification of the sectoral model of 
accumulation. Furthermore, increases in both labour productivity and TCC are not indicative 
of any recovery or sectoral reconfiguration that will avoid such distortions in the future, so 
they are mere conjunctural upturns product of job losses. 
Behind these features of capital accumulation, there is the critical importance of sectoral rates 
of inflation. Excluding finance, the sectors with less TCC have generally had increases over 
4% in average annual price deflators, particularly RES and CNT. In the other group, the 
activities of the GOV and the IND have also had some inflationary component, above 3%. 
However, the heterogeneity in the evolution of the different price deflators has amplified, 
with deflationary dynamics in both groups of activities. 
Figure 8. Price deflators by sector of activity 
Annual rates of change (%) 
 
                    Source: INE (2014a) 
The most illustrative aspect reveals itself in the kind of inverse relationship between sectoral 
inflation and productivity performance during the growth phase. Activities with inflation 
above the average (4%) had absolute declines in labour productivity. The agricultural sector 
could be added to this group, whose deflator increased at 0.98% per year. Thus, sectors with 
the highest relative level of TCC, which had increases of Y/L, although small, have had 
below average inflation, and in the case of INCO, even below 2%. 
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Figure 9. Productivity Vs prices 
Annual rates of change of labour productivity (right) and prices (left) 
 
                            Notes: in red, finances and real estate activities 
                            Source: INE (2014a) 
CONCLUSIONS AND ECONOMICS IMPLICATIONS 
Imbalances in the process of capital accumulation in Spain have been associated with the 
relationship between the housing boom, especially real estate, and the tradable Vs non 
tradable character of the activities. This particular dynamic led to a model of reproduction 
during the 1999-07 period following just the opposite trend as would be expected from the 
above-mentioned theoretical framework in terms of technical change, costs and productivity.  
First, the accumulation of capital was in fact the engine of the economic growth in Spain, 
averaging 4.69% in the 8-year phase, but a number of distortions have been found. Thus, it 
was a labour-intensive growth (rising 3.57% per year), so our proxy for TCC barely rose by 
8.78%. As a consequence, the labour requirements per unit of capital (PkW parameter) did 
not drop, but it did increase (16.5%), so VCC rose 10 percentage point more than TCC; and 
so happened with a stagnated labour productivity. The result was a 16 percentage point 
increase in total costs per unit of product, explained by inputs and not because of wages.  
One of the related facts is the increase of the capital deflator in relation to that of GDP, 
showing an underlying problem in the access (either producing of importing) to these assets. 
Conversely, the long recession (2008-12) brought the opposite relationship among these 
variables: rising TCC (31%) based on the abrupt drop of employment, which at least fostered 
labour productivity more than 10% and reduced PkW, so the increase of VCC was slowed 
down.  
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Second, this macroeconomic balance can only be grasped by addressing the price-effect of 
the housing boom together with the sectoral disequilibria.  
i) There is a deep divergence in terms of price deflators when analyzing the assets of 
the stock of capital: those related with construction (<50% in 1999-07) versus 
machinery and equipment (16-20%), and even an absolute cheapening in 
intangible ones. The underlying price-effect of the housing boom is revealed 
because the assets with higher increase in prices have been the most dynamic of 
the accumulation process (70% of total investment in 1999-07 and still two-thirds 
during the recession); 
ii) And also, there is a sectoral distortion. Again, two thirds of total investment, 
including that of residential type, was channeled to sectors with lower relative 
levels of TCC (labour-intensive): other services, construction (real estate) and 
professional services, with the exception of information and communications 
(capital-intensive). Contradictory, as investment was price-led, these dynamic 
(and below-average TCC) sectors of activity had absolute declines in labour 
productivity between -10 and -25%, with the exceptions of other services (having 
the lowest level of mechanisation), and finances. In this sense, the same sectors 
with lower TCC have generally had relative higher levels of prices increases, over 
4% average per year, particularly real estate and construction, and with declines in 
labour productivity. Unfortunately, the 5 years following the outbreak of the crisis 
have not changed these facts.  
These distortions in terms of prices, productivity and costs have a number of implications in 
various spheres of the economy, as it is the case of distribution and the external insertion. On 
the one hand, there is no objective basis on which wages could rise without threatening the 
continuity of the housing boom, whose reproduction is based precisely on a wage regression 
that also reveals its inner limits: the house price cannot increase indefinitely regardless of the 
fundamentals of the law of value. Real wages per worker fell by 3.44% during the boom, 
while increased by 11.7% with the crisis.
16
  
                                                 
16
 Although data depend on the statistical sources and the price deflator used (see Ameco 2015 and OECD 
2015), which could lead to the conclusion of real wages falling in 1999-07 with GDP deflator or slightly 
increasing. However, the housing boom poses some difficulties when measuring the purchasing power of wages, 
and somehow it becomes a means for the real wage reduction. The increase in the housing price, a durable 
consumer good, is not correctly reflected in the CPI. While the average price of square meter of private housing 
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On the other, the rising cost of inputs and the decline in productivity in the growth phase led 
to a problem of competitiveness, even in the low-medium sectors in which it is specialized. 
Thus, Spanish competitiveness indices from the BoS (2015) show relative increases in costs 
between 1999 and 2007: 16% in relation to EMU-18, 13-14% with the EU-28, and 12-13% 
when taking the unit relative labour costs. In addition, the price effect of the housing boom 
and the relative dynamism of the activities of non-tradable goods are reflected in a relatively 
high inflation compared with the Eurozone. Note that in a context characterised by the 
existence of a single currency, it implies an appreciation of the Spanish real exchange rate, 
aggravated by the appreciation of the Euro, more than 75% between February 2002 and 
March-July 2008 (BoS, 2015a). Therefore, the accumulation of capital has brought an 
increase in imports, with the corresponding deficit of the trade and the current account 
balances, up to 10% of GDP. 
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